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DISTINGUISHING LAY FROM EXPERT
OPINION: THE NEED TO FOCUS ON THE
EPISTEMOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE REASONING
PROCESSES USED BY LAY AND
EXPERT WITNESSES
Edward J. Imwinkelried*
JUSTICE Holmes once remarked that the law is constantly drawinglines.1 That remark certainly holds true for Evidence law. There area myriad of distinctions in Evidence law.2 For instance, although
there is a general rule excluding hearsay evidence,3 the rule is inapplica-
ble when the testimony about the out-of-court statement is logically rele-
vant for a non-hearsay purpose,4 that is, a purpose other than proving the
truth of the assertions in the statement. Likewise, there are distinct rules
for character evidence relevant to a witness’s credibility5 and character
evidence offered to prove a fact on the historical merits of the case.6
Thus, although Evidence law sharply restricts character evidence relevant
to the historical merits,7 those restrictions pose no barrier to admissibility
when the proponent of the item of evidence can identify a viable non-
character theory of logical relevance.8 For example, suppose that an ac-
cused is charged with a February 1 theft. The character evidence rules
would preclude the prosecution from offering testimony about a January
1 theft by the same accused if the prosecution’s only theory of logical
relevance were that the January theft showed that the accused has a pro-
pensity for theft and, hence, is more likely to have committed the Febru-
* Edward L. Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law Emeritus, School of Law, University of
California Davis; former chair, Evidence Section, American Association of Law Schools;
coauthor, Paul C. Giannelli, Edward J. Imwinkelried, Andrea Roth & Jane Campbell Mor-
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1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 127 (1881).
2. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY DISTINCTIONS: UNDERSTANDING THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (1993).
3. FED. R. EVID. 802.
4. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
5. FED. R. EVID. 608–09.
6. FED. R. EVID. 404–05.
7. Id.
8. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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ary crime.9 However, assume that in the January theft, the accused stole a
pistol with a unique serial number. Assume further that the perpetrator
of the February crime inadvertently dropped that very pistol at the crime
scene. In those circumstances, the prosecution could introduce the testi-
mony on the non-character theory that without positing any forbidden
assumption about the accused’s propensity, the evidence about the un-
charged, January crime is logically relevant to show the accused’s identity
as the perpetrator of the charged, February offense.10
In the past, federal courts,11 state courts,12 and commentators13 have
often complained that these distinctions are thin and problematic. Today
a similar complaint is being leveled against another evidentiary distinc-
tion, that is, the difference between lay opinion and expert opinion testi-
mony.14 According to some commentators, the courts are currently
experiencing “tremendous difficulty” differentiating between those two
types of opinion testimony.15 The distinction calls on the courts to deter-
mine “when [an opinion] leaves the lay witness realm and crosses over
into the expert witness realm.”16 Many courts are struggling to define
“the fine line” between the two kinds of opinion testimony.17
It is not just that the line is proving difficult for some courts to manage.
In the past two decades, the line has assumed greater importance than
ever before.
To begin with, the line has a tremendous impact on pretrial discovery.
Since 1993,18 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 has mandated that the
proponent of an expert witness disclose to the opposition a report
9. FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (“Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible
to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character.”). Under Rule 105, upon request the trial judge
must give the jury a limiting instruction. FED. R. EVID. 105. In one negative prong of the
instruction, the judge would forbid the jury from reasoning simplistically that “he did it
once, therefore he did it again.” In the other, affirmative prong, the judge would explain
the legitimate non-character use of the evidence.
10. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2) (“This evidence may be admissible for another purpose,
such as proving . . . identity . . . .”).
11. United States v. Derington, 229 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 2000) (“There is, no
doubt, a fine line between evidence proving character (inadmissible) and evidence proving
matters like intent and lack of mistake (admissible).”); United States v. Bass, 794 F.2d
1305, 1312 (8th Cir. 1986).
12. State v. Brown, 900 A.2d 1155, 1160 (R.I. 2006) (“The line between Rule 404(a)
evidence presented for the impermissible purpose of demonstrating propensity and Rule
404(b) evidence presented for one of the specific non-propensity exceptions is both a fine
one to draw and an even more difficult one for judges and juries to follow.”).
13. Note, Admissibility of Evidence of Similar Offenses in Criminal Prosecutions in
West Virginia, 54 W. VA. L. REV. 142, 144 (1951); Note, Rule 311—Evidence of Other
Crimes or Civil Wrongs, 1947 WIS. L. REV. 405, 411 n.11 (1947).
14. Susan C. Scieszinski, Note, Using Nonscientific Expert Testimony: A Play-by-Play
Toolkit, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 1161, 1181 (2013).
15. Id. at 1181.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1182.
18. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED & THEODORE Y. BLUMOFF, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY:
STRATEGY AND TACTICS § 5:3 (rev. 2004).
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previewing the expert’s proposed testimony.19 The mandate is part of a
new set of required pre-discovery disclosures; the proponent must pro-
vide the opposition with the report even if the opposition has not re-
quested the report.20 The report must be detailed.21 In the words of Rule
26, the report must set out, inter alia, “all opinions the witness will ex-
press and the basis and reasons for them.”22 Furthermore, the mandate
has real teeth. If the proponent fails to file the report in a timely fashion,
the trial judge can altogether bar any testimony by the expert.23 Even if
the proponent files a report, the report limits the permissible testimony
by the expert; at trial, the expert may not testify about an opinion omitted
in the report.24 However, by its terms, the Rule 26 provision applies only
to expert opinion testimony.25 In contrast, there is no need for a report
describing any lay opinion testimony that the proponent contemplates in-
troducing at trial. In the same year, 1993, Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 16 was amended to give an accused a right to demand a similar
report.26 Like its civil counterpart, the Rule 16 requirement is restricted
to expert testimony.27
Another 1993 development, the Supreme Court’s rendition of its cele-
brated decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,28 also
enhanced the importance of the distinction between lay and expert opin-
ion testimony. In that case, the Court had occasion to interpret Federal
Rule of Evidence 702.29 The statute governs the admissibility of expert
testimony.30 The wording of the statute refers to “scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge.”31 The Court focused on the expression,
“scientific . . . knowledge.”32 The Court adopted an essentially method-
ological definition of the expression.33 The Court announced that before
a scientific witness may rely on a theory or technique as the premise for
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B); Consol. Envtl. Mgmt., Inc. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp.,
981 F. Supp. 2d 523, 531–33 (E.D. La. 2013).
20. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A) (“without awaiting a discovery request”).
21. R.C. Olmstead, Inc. v. CU Interface, LLC, 606 F.3d 262, 271 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Ex-
pert reports must include ‘how’ and ‘why’ the expert reached a particular result, not merely
the expert’s conclusory opinions.”); Adams v. J. Meyers Builders, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 262,
268–70 (D.N.H. 2009).
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
23. Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1267–68 (Fed. Cir.
2008); Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 936, 943 (8th Cir. 2004);
Sih v. United States, 90 Fed. Appx. 940 (7th Cir. 2004); Griffith v. E. Me. Med. Ctr., 599 F.
Supp. 2d 59, 63–64 (D. Me. 2009).
24. ArcelorMittal France v. AK Steel Corp., 811 F. Supp. 2d 960 (D. Del. 2011), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, 700 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Bowers v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Ass’n,
564 F. Supp. 2d 322 (D.N.J. 2008).
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
26. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(G) (“at the defendant’s request”).
27. Id.
28. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
29. Id. at 591–92.
30. FED. R. EVID. 702.
31. Id.
32. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
33. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Daubert Decision: Frye Is Dead, Long Live the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 29 TRIAL 60 (Sept. 1993).
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an opinion, the expert’s proponent must establish that the theory or tech-
nique has been validated by sound scientific methodology such as con-
trolled experimentation.34 Simply stated, a theory or technique must be
reliable in that sense to serve as a basis for expert testimony. In 1999, in
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,35 the Court expanded on Daubert. There
the Court ruled that the general requirement for a showing of reliability
applies across the board to all types of expert testimony.36 Significantly,
like the 1993 amendment to Civil Rule 26, Federal Evidence Rule 702
governs only expert testimony.37
A post-Kumho development, a 2000 amendment to Federal Rule of
Evidence 701, underscored the significance of the distinction between lay
and expert opinion testimony.38 The drafters recognized that in order to
circumvent the 1993 amendment to Rule 26 and the Daubert line of au-
thority, litigators had sometimes mislabeled expert opinion as lay opin-
ion.39 To curb that abuse, the drafters added a new provision to Rule 701
governing lay opinion testimony.40 The new provision states: “If a witness
is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is lim-
ited to one that is: . . . (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”41 The Advisory
Committee Note accompanying the 2000 amendment states:
Rule 701 has been amended to eliminate the risk that the reliability
requirement set forth in Rule 702 will be evaded through the simple
expedient of proffering an expert in lay witness clothing. Under the
amendment, a witness’s testimony must be scrutinized under the
rules regulating expert opinion to the extent that the witness is pro-
viding testimony based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. . . . By channeling testi-
mony that is actually expert testimony to Rule 702, the amendment
also ensures that a party will not evade the expert witness disclosure
requirements set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and Fed. R. Crim. P. 16
by simply calling an expert witness in the guise of a layperson.42
These formal legal developments, the rule amendments and the Su-
preme Court decisions, necessitate that lower courts draw the line be-
tween lay and expert opinions. However, the Court’s decisions are part of
a broader trend, namely, reformulating evidentiary rules along epistemo-
34. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93.
35. 526 U.S. 137, 147–48 (1999).
36. Id. at 147.
37. FED. R. EVID. 702.




42. Id. (advisory committee’s note).
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logical lines.43 In both Daubert44 and Kumho,45 the Court returned to
epistemological fundamentals; the Court emphasized that to serve as a
basis for admissible testimony, any expert claim must amount to “knowl-
edge” within the meaning of that expression in Rule 702. It is true that
the statute refers to “scientific, technical, or other specialized” expertise,
but each adjective modifies the same noun, “knowledge.”46 The Daubert
Court stated that to qualify as reliable “knowledge,” a claim must be sup-
ported by “more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.”47 To
date, most of the scholarly commentary has focused on the question of
whether an expert testifying to an opinion is making a justifiable knowl-
edge claim: The expert’s proponent must demonstrate that there is an
adequate empirical warrant for the claim.48 However, delimiting lay opin-
ion knowledge claims from expert opinion knowledge claims may deepen
our understanding of the latter. In both cases, the witness is advancing a
knowledge claim. Drawing a line between the warrant necessary for a lay
claim and the justification required for an expert claim ought to refine
our understanding of the way in which both types of claims should be
validated. Hence, like the formal legal developments, the emergence of
this broad epistemological trend heightens the importance of establishing
a border between lay and expert opinion.
The purpose of this brief essay is to explore that border. The first part
of the essay discusses several possible bases for distinguishing between
lay and expert opinion. Some possibilities relate to the policy rationale
for admitting the two types of opinions. Others concern the opinion it-
self—the topic of the witness’s ultimate conclusion, the degree of specific-
ity of the opinion, or the definiteness of the opinion. This part concludes
that none of those possibilities is a satisfactory basis for distinguishing
between the two types of opinions. The second part of the essay proposes
an alternative epistemological basis, that is, the nature of the reasoning
processes underlying the opinions. This part argues that both lay and ex-
43. Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for
Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 750–52 (1994); Margaret G. Farrell, Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemology and Legal Process, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
2183, 2189–90 (1994); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Epistemological Trend in the Evolution
of the Law of Expert Testimony: A Scrutiny at Once Broader, Narrower, and Deeper, 47
GA. L. REV. 863, 882–85 (2013); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Serendipitous Timing: The Coin-
cidental Emergence of the New Brain Science and the Advent of an Epistemological Ap-
proach to Determining the Admissibility of Expert Testimony, 62 MERCER L. REV. 959,
974–75 (2011); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing a Simi-
larly Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert Testi-
mony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2277–94 (1994).
44. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
45. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
46. FED. R. EVID. 702.
47. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
48. See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy of
Expertise for the Post-Kumho World, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 508, 512–24 (2000); D.
Michael Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”: Non-Science Forensic Science After Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 776 (2000); Ronald J. Allen &
Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or Education?, 87 NW.
U. L. REV. 1131, 1138–39 (1993).
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pert opinions amount to comparative judgments. The common denomina-
tor is that in both cases, the witness is comparing a generalization to a
case-specific fact or facts. The differences, though, are that lay and expert
witnesses derive their generalizations in radically different manners and
often acquire their information about the case-specific facts in a quite
different fashion. Building on part two, the third and final part of the
essay explains why the epistemological differences between lay and ex-
pert opinions necessitate very different admissibility standards for the
two types of opinions. The essay illustrates the differences by applying
the proposed analysis to one of the modern battlegrounds for opinion
evidence, testimony by experienced police officers about code words used
by drug gangs.
I. THE POSSIBLE BASES FOR DISTINGUISHING LAY
OPINION FROM EXPERT OPINION
A. THE DIFFERING POLICY RATIONALES FOR ADMITTING
LAY AND EXPERT OPINIONS
In attempting to distinguish lay and expert opinions, in the first in-
stance it may be useful to inquire why we admit the two types of opinions.
There is a consensus on the basic policy rationales for accepting the two
kinds of opinions.49
In the case of lay opinions, the policy justification is a necessity ratio-
nale.50 The premise of the argument is the lay witness’s inability to articu-
late all the data he or she is relying on.51 If a lay witness contemplates
opining about the speed of a passing car—a so-called collective fact opin-
ion52—the witness is implicitly relying on the many other occasions when
the witness has observed motor vehicles on the road. It is infeasible to
expect the witness to articulate all that data and put the jurors in as good
a position as the witness to draw the inference. Likewise, if a lay witness
proposes opining about the handwriting style of the purported author—
termed a skilled lay observer opinion53—the witness will rely on all the
49. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Taxonomy of Testimony Post-Kumho: Refocusing on
the Bottom Lines of Reliability and Necessity, 30 CUMB. L. REV. 185, 195 (2000).
50. KENNETH S. BROWN, 1 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 11 (7th ed. 2013).
51. Id. at 68–71; DEL. CODE ANN. § 701(1) (2014) (when the witness cannot readily
communicate, and with equal accuracy and adequacy, communicate what he has perceived
to the trier of fact, without testifying in terms of inferences or opinions); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 90.701(1) (2014); Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 417 (1952); Vir-
gin Islands v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 630 (3d Cir.) (articulate), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 994
(1993); United States v. Yazzie, 976 F.2d 1252, 1255-56 (9th Cir. 1992) (describe); United
States v. Jackson, 688 F.2d 1121 (7th Cir. 1982) (communicate), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1043
(1983); Tillman v. State, 630 S.W.2d 5, 10 (Ark. 1982) (verbalize), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1201 (1983); People v. Fiore, 174 Cal. Rptr. 3d 806, 823 (Cal. App. 2014) (“[A] lay witness’s
opinion ‘is admissible . . . as a matter of practical necessity when the matters . . . observed
are too complex or too subtle to enable [the witness] accurately to convey them to [the
trial] court or jury in any other manner.’”); Giller Indus. v. Consol. Casting Corp., 590
S.W.2d 818, 820 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (communicate).
52. BROWN, supra note 50, § 11.
53. Id. at 70–71.
2015] Distinguishing Lay from Expert Opinion 79
prior occasions when he or she was exposed to the author’s writing.
Again, it is unrealistic to expect the witness to describe all earlier occa-
sions. If the juror is to have the benefit of the witness’s prior experience,
the judge must accord the witness some latitude to opine and not merely
recite primary facts. Thus, in these circumstances there is an element of
necessity for admitting lay opinions.54
The case for admitting expert opinions is very different. The policy ra-
tionale for admitting lay opinion testimony is an element of necessity, the
witness’s inability to verbalize all the underlying data and put the jury in
as good a position to draw the inference.55 In the case of expert testi-
mony, though, the argument is that even if the jury could be provided
with all the underlying data, the lay trier of fact lacks the knowledge or
skill to draw as reliable a conclusion from the data:
Suppose, for example, that the witness is a forensic pathologist . . . .
Initially, the pathologist describes [in detail] the condition of the ca-
daver at the time it was delivered to the morgue. At the time of the
delivery of the cadaver, a technician took a large number of photo-
graphs of the cadaver. The photographs depict a pink discoloration
in the lower regions of the body. Between the photographs and the
witness’s description of the condition of the cadaver, the trier of fact
has all the primary data known to the pathologist. Should that bar
the introduction of the pathologist’s opinion about the significance of
the discoloration? No. Over objection, the trial judge would un-
doubtedly permit the pathologist to explain that the discoloration
was evidence of postmortem lividity and make a time-of-death
(TOD) estimate based on the extent of the lividity. The witness can
convey the primary data about the condition of the cadaver to the
trier of fact, but the trier lacks the expertise to draw a reliable infer-
ence from the data.56
Although lay opinions certainly differ from expert opinions with re-
spect to the fundamental policy justification for admitting the two types
of opinions, this difference is of little assistance to trial judges attempting
to differentiate between lay and expert opinion when ruling on the admis-
sibility of an opinion. This difference exists at a high level of abstraction.
Even more to the point, the evident difference in policy rationales does
not provide the trial judge with a complete analytic framework for deter-
mining the admissibility of the two types of opinion. As a matter of logic,
the fact that a lay witness cannot articulate all of the primary sensory data
underlying an opinion does not dictate the conclusion that the opinion is
sufficiently reliable to be admissible. There is no logical necessity for pos-
iting an inverse relationship between the difficulty of articulating the data
underpinning an opinion and the reliability of the opinion. Similarly, even
if an expert can draw a more trustworthy inference on a subject than a
layperson, neither the lay nor the expert opinion may be reliable enough
54. Imwinkelried, The Taxonomy of Testimony Post-Kumho, supra note 49, at 195.
55. Id. at 194–95.
56. Id. at 195–96.
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to meaningfully enhance the accuracy of the fact-finding process. A trial
judge seeking to distinguish lay from expert opinion should certainly ap-
preciate the differing policy rationales, but the judge needs more to be
able to intelligently draw the line and make an admissibility ruling.
B. DIFFERING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TWO TYPES OF OPINION
If the differing policy rationales cannot serve as a basis for drawing the
line, perhaps some differing characteristic of the two types of opinions
could furnish a manageable basis for a distinction. There are several
candidates.
1. The Topic of the Opinion
It might be argued that lay and expert opinions differ in that lay wit-
nesses cannot opine on the same subjects as experts. In some cases, that
argument has merit. For example, no trial judge in his or her right mind
would permit a lay witness to testify to an estimated time of death (TOD)
based on algor mortis, the postmortem decline of the cadaver’s body tem-
perature.57 To testify on that subject, a witness would need some medical
training and ideally possess the credentials of a pathologist.58 Nor would
a judge allow a lay witness to rest an opinion about a vehicle’s speed on
the measurement of the yaw marks left by the vehicle.59 To venture that
opinion, a witness would have to have the sort of understanding of the
laws of motion familiar to physicists and accident reconstruction
experts.60
Nevertheless, it is an oversimplification to assert that lay opinions are
distinguishable from expert opinions because lay opinions cannot address
the same topics as expert opinions. Quite to the contrary, in many cases a
lay witness may express an opinion on the identical subject as an expert.
For example, just as qualified mental health professionals may opine
about a subject’s sanity, some types of lay witnesses may do so. California
Evidence Code § 870(a) states that a lay witness “may state his opinion as
to the sanity of a person when . . . [t]he witness is an intimate acquain-
tance of the person whose sanity is in question.”61 At common law, the
courts often dubbed these witnesses skilled lay observers as to sanity.62
Likewise, just as many courts permit expert questioned document exam-
iners (QD) to opine about the author of a writing such as a will or let-
57. 2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 19.08[a], at 277–79 (5th ed.
2012).
58. Id. at § 19.10[a], at 292–96.
59. Id. at § 27.06[b]. When a vehicle brakes, the resulting road mark is a skidmark.
However, if a driver is attempting to negotiate a curve, begins to lose control, and then
tries to steer through the curve, the vehicle sideslips and leaves a yaw mark. The formula
for estimating speed from skidmarks differs from the formula used for estimating speed
from yaw marks.
60. Id. at § 27.10[b].
61. CAL. EVID. CODE § 870 (2014).
62. BROWN, supra note 50, 11.
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ter,63 the courts accept lay testimony on the subject when the lay witness
has substantial familiarity with the author’s handwriting style.64 Federal
Rule of Evidence 901(b)(2) authorizes the receipt of “[a] nonexpert’s
opinion that handwriting is genuine, based on a familiarity with it that
was not acquired for the current litigation.”65 Even without the benefit of
a statute such as 901(b)(2), at common law the courts treated such evi-
dence as admissible skilled lay observer testimony.66 The upshot is that in
many instances, the courts accept both lay and expert opinions on the
very same topic.
2. The Specificity of the Opinion
Perhaps it could be contended that lay and expert opinions differ in
that expert opinions can be more specific than lay opinions. Again, there
is a measure of truth in this assertion. As the preceding paragraph
pointed out, if a lay witness is familiar with a person’s baseline behavior,
a judge may admit the witness’s opinion that on a particular occasion the
person’s behavior deviated from the baseline so substantially that the
person was insane.67 However, a judge would not permit the lay witness
to go to the length of specifically opining that the person was manic de-
pressive.68 To offer that opinion, the witness would need some credentials
as a mental health expert.69
However, on closer scrutiny, the contention once again proves to be an
oversimplification. Consider, for example, opinions about handwriting
identification. Given the right facts, both a lay skilled observer and a
questioned document examiner may opine that a certain person had au-
thored a particular writing; the two types of experts can testify at the
same level of specificity. Indeed, if the expert had access to only a limited
number of authenticated exemplars of the suspected author’s handwrit-
ing,70 the judge would conceivably permit a lay witness to give a more
specific opinion than an expert. If the expert had only a small number of
exemplars to compare to the questioned document, the court might re-
strict the expert to opining that the author was a member of a class of
persons such as arthritic individuals.71 In contrast, the same judge could
allow a skilled lay observer to express the opinion that the author was a
particular individual.
63. GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 57, § 21.07[a].
64. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(2).
65. Id.
66. BROWN, supra note 50, § 11.
67. United States v. Walshe, 526 Fed. Appx. 834, 838 (10th Cir. 2013).
68. Id. at 838–39.
69. GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 57, § 9.11, at 608–09.
70. Id. § 21.02[a], at 390–91: see also § 21.07[d], at 459-61.
71. Id. § 21.02[b], at 393.
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2. The Degree of Definiteness of the Opinion
At first blush, it might appear that lay opinions can be distinguished
from expert opinions on the basis that all truly expert opinions can be
stated to a degree of scientific certainty or at least probability. Admit-
tedly, in many jurisdictions the traditional rule was that an expert must
vouch for his or her opinion as a scientific certainty or probability.72
However, even accepting the traditional rule as a given, it is fallacious to
leap to either the conclusion that all expert opinions can be stated as a
certainty or the conclusion that the degree of certitude of expert opinions
is a characteristic that distinguishes expert from lay opinion.
To begin with, many jurisdictions have abandoned the requirement that
an expert vouch for his or her opinion as a certainty or probability.73 The
initial inroads were cases involving expert prognoses which are necessa-
rily speculative.74 The courts then broadened the inroads. In the words of
the Ohio Supreme Court,
While several decisions from this court indicated that speculative
opinions by medical experts are inadmissible since they are based on
possibilities and not probabilities . . . we believe that the better prac-
tice, especially in criminal cases, is to let experts testify in terms of
possibility.75
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not contain any language that could
reasonably bear the interpretation that it codifies an invariable require-
ment that expert opinions be couched as certainties or probabilities. As a
general proposition, under the Federal Rules an expert opinion’s lack of
certainty cuts to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.76
Moreover, even when most jurisdictions still followed the traditional
rule, the courts did not do so because they believed that by their very
nature, all expert opinions are certain. Quite the opposite is true. Instead,
the courts recognized that the degree of certitude of expert opinions can
vary radically. Recognizing that, the courts ruled admissible only those
72. Glenn E. Bradford, Dissecting Missouri’s Requirement of “Reasonable Medical
Certainty,” 57 J. MO. BAR 136 (2001); Gregory Joseph, Less than “Certain” Medical Testi-
mony, 14 TRIAL 51 (1978); James McElaney, Expert Witnesses and the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 28 MERCER L. REV. 463, 477 (1977); Michael M. Martin, The Uncertain Rule of
Certainty: An Analysis and Proposal for a Federal Rule of Evidence Rule, 20 WAYNE L.
REV. 781, 782 (1974); Medical Evidence–Sufficiency of Expert’s Opinion, 17 DEF. L. J. 181,
185–89 (1968).
73. Cage v. City of Chi., 979 F. Supp. 2d 787, 809 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (“Rule 702 does not
require ‘that an expert’s opinion testimony be expressed in terms of a reasonable scientific
certainty in order to be admissible.’ Stutzman v. CRST, Inc., 997 F.2d 291, 296 (7th Cir.
1993) (quoting United States v. Cyphers, 553 F.2d 1064, 1072 (7th Cir. 1977).”); GIANNELLI
ET AL., supra note 57, § 5.06, at 340–41 n.178 (collecting cases admitting expert opinions
that were not stated in those terms).
74. Joseph, supra note 72, at 51–52.
75. State v. D’Ambrosio, 616 N.E. 2d 909 (1993). See also In re Swine Flu Immuniza-
tion Prods. Liab. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 567, 578 (D. Colo. 1980).
76. In re Swine Flu, 533 F. Supp. at 578; Ernst v. City of Chicago, 39 F. Supp. 3d 1005,
1015 (N.D. Ill. 2014). Of course, the indefiniteness of an opinion reduces its probative
worth and could render the opinion vulnerable to an objection under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 403. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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opinions that the expert could convincingly characterize as a certainty or
probability. The courts’ ruling reflected an understanding that certainty is
not an inherent characteristic of an expert opinion.
Furthermore, the early courts imposed the traditional requirement for
policy reasons that had nothing to do with any supposed inherent cer-
tainty of expert opinions. The courts enforced the traditional rule while
the Frye general acceptance test was the prevailing standard for the ad-
missibility of scientific testimony.77 The principal rationale for the Frye
test was the fear that lay jurors would ascribe undue weight to expert
testimony.78 In that light, it was understandable that the courts would
insist that an expert had to characterize any admissible opinion as a cer-
tainty or probability:
The proponents of Frye believe that the jury is likely to overestimate
the value of scientific evidence; the fear is that the jurors will treat
any scientific opinion as dispositive even when the opinion does not
deserve that much weight. Given that fear, it makes sense to limit
admissible expert opinions to statements of certainty or probability;
the courts should admit only opinions that in the experts’ judgment,
are entitled to the weight the jurors are likely to attach to the
opinion.79
Thus, the traditional rule did not rest on a dubious assumption that
expert opinions are inherently certain or that in that respect, they differ
in kind from lay opinions. As a matter of epistemology, the degree of
definiteness of any opinion depends on the extent of the warrant for the
witness’s knowledge claim. Simply stated, the classification of the opinion
as lay or expert is irrelevant.
C. SUMMARY
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence have been in effect for almost
40 years, the Supreme Court has not yet had an occasion to construe Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 701 governing lay opinions. However, the Court
has had several opportunities to comment on Rule 702 dealing with ex-
pert testimony. In those cases,80 the Court has consistently emphasized
that under Rule 702, the trial judge’s gatekeeping responsibility is to en-
77. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE METHODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
§ 6–6[d] (5th ed. 2014).
78. GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 57, § 1.06[a].
79. IMWINKELRIED, THE METHODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note
77, § 6–6[d], at 6-28-29.
80. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–98 (1993); Joiner v. Gen.
Elec., 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999); Weis-
gram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 445 (2000).
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sure that only “reliable” opinions are submitted to the jury.81 In that
light, the use of any of the distinctions proposed in this part would yield
wrong-minded results.
Focusing exclusively on the rationale for admitting lay opinions men-
tioned in subpart I.A is of little help. To demonstrate that the rationale
applies in a given case, the proponent of the lay opinion must show that
the lay witness is unable to articulate all the underlying data.82 However,
that negative showing does not affirmatively guarantee the reliability of
the opinion.
Likewise, none of the characteristics discussed above in subpart II.A
can serve as the basis for a general rule enabling the trial judge to decide
when it is permissible to admit a lay opinion. It is simply not true that lay
and experts cannot render reliable opinions on the same subject. As we
have seen, sometimes lay and expert witnesses can form equally reliable
opinions on the identical subject; the opinions derive their reliability from
different sources, but both types of opinions are nonetheless reliable.
Moreover, as the questioned document hypothetical illustrated, there are
situations in which a layperson can form a more specific reliable opinion
than a forensic examiner. Finally, the essential distinction cannot be the
definiteness of the opinion. The fundamental reliability of a purportedly
definite opinion depends on its underlying warrant, not the formal classi-
fication of the opinion as lay or expert. In short, each of the potential
distinctions discussed above turns out to be a cul-de-sac.
II. A PROPOSED BASIS FOR DISTINGUISHING LAY
OPINIONS FROM EXPERT OPINIONS: A FOCUS ON
THE REASONING PROCESS CULMINATING
IN THE OPINION
As Part I demonstrated, the proposed bases for distinguishing lay and
expert opinion discussed in that part are unsatisfactory. The difference in
policy rationales cannot provide the trial judge with a complete analytic
framework. The proposals related to the topic and specificity of the opin-
ion are flawed, resting on oversimplifications. For its part, the proposal
based on the definiteness of the opinion misconceives the scope of and
rationale for the traditional rule requiring expert opinions to be couched
as certainties or probabilities. Perhaps the drafters of the 2000 amend-
ment to Rule 701 intuited that the prior attempts to distinguish the two
types of opinion had been failures. Since those attempts were dead ends,
the drafters looked elsewhere. Therefore, in the last paragraph of their
new Advisory Committee Note, the drafters suggested another basis:
The amendment incorporates the distinctions set forth in State v.
Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 549 (1992), a case involving a former Ten-
nessee Rule of Evidence 701, a rule that declared that the distinction
81.
82. Imwinkelried, The Taxonomy of Testimony Post-Kumho, supra note 49, at 197.
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between lay and expert witness testimony is that lay testimony “re-
sults from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life,” while
expert testimony “results from a process of reasoning which can be
mastered only by specialists in the field.” The court in Brown noted
that a lay witness with experience could testify that a substance ap-
peared to be blood, but that a witness would have to qualify as an
expert before he could testify that bruising around the eyes is indica-
tive of skull trauma. That is the kind of distinction made by the
amendment to this Rule.83
The drafters were on the right track. Rather than focusing on a charac-
teristic of the opinion itself—its subject, its specificity, or its definite-
ness—the drafters point to the process of reasoning that the witness
employs to derive the opinion.84 However, neither the Note nor the
Brown opinion nor the former Tennessee rule specifies the way in which
the two reasoning processes diverge.85 How does the “process of reason-
ing” underlying a lay opinion differ from the process underlying an expert
opinion?
It is submitted that the essential insight into the reasoning processes is
that when any witness, lay or expert,86 forms an opinion about the signifi-
83. FED. R. EVID. 701 (advisory committee’s note).
84. Id.
85. Id.; State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 549 (1992); TEN. R. EVID. 701.
86. It must be remembered that sometimes a testifying expert does not offer an opin-
ion about the significance of any fact in the case. The original Advisory Committee Note to
Rule 702 states:
Most of the literature assumes that experts testify only in the form of opin-
ions. The assumption is logically unfounded. The rule accordingly recognizes
that an expert on the stand may give a dissertation or exposition of scientific
or other principles relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them
to the facts. Since much of the criticism of expert testimony has centered
upon the hypothetical question, it seems wise to recognize that opinions are
not indispensable and to encourage the use of expert testimony in non-opin-
ion form when counsel believes the trier can itself draw the requisite
inference.
FED. R. EVID. 702 (advisory committee’s note). That passage explains why the text of Rule
702 permits an expert to testify “in the form of an opinion or otherwise . . . .” See State v.
Salazar-Mercado, 325 P.3d 996, 999 (Ariz. 2014) (without referring to the specific facts of
the case, a prosecution forensic interviewer proposed testifying about child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome (CSAAS) and how child victims of sexual abuse behave; the
Arizona Supreme Court rejected a defense contention that the witness’s testimony was
inadmissible unless she applied the generalization to the particular facts in the case).
In some cases, the expert’s proponent may believe that it is tactically advisable for the
jurors themselves to apply the general theory or technique to the facts of the case. If the
jurors themselves independently draw the inference, they may attach greater weight to it.
In other cases, the state of the empirical data may not allow the expert to opine about the
significance of the fact or facts in the case. For instance, although many courts allow psy-
chologists to testify about the general unreliability of eyewitness identifications, the courts
balk at allowing the expert to opine that the identification in the instant case was unrelia-
ble or inaccurate. BROWN, supra note 50, § 12. Although the available empirical studies
establish that certain factors such the cross-racial nature of an identification can reduce the
probability of an accurate identification, the researchers have not designed and conducted
the further studies necessary to develop criteria for determining when a specific identifica-
tion is likely to be inaccurate. Id. at 81–82.
In any event, if the expert testifies only about a general theory or principle without
purporting to apply the theory or principle to the facts of the case, the proponent must still
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cance of a fact or facts in the case, he or she is making a comparative
judgment. One term of the comparison is a generalization such as the
normal appearance of a particular author’s handwriting style or the symp-
tomatology of a certain disease. The other term of the comparison is a
case-specific fact such as a questioned document or a set of case-specific
facts such as a patient’s case history. Both lay and expert witnesses reason
to their opinions by comparing the case-specific fact or facts to the gener-
alization.87 However, as we shall see, the two types of witnesses differ
fundamentally with respect to: (1) how they derive the generalization
they rely on, and (2) how they acquire their information about the case-
specific fact or facts.
A. LAY OPINIONS
The published opinions admitting lay opinions tend to fall into two cat-
egories: collective fact or shorthand rendition opinions and skilled lay ob-
server opinions.88 In the former category, the courts admit testimony
about such subjects as a person’s height, weight, intoxication, and age as
well as the speed of a passing vehicle.89 In the latter category, the courts
allow lay witnesses to opine on such topics as the author of a particular
writing or a person’s sanity at a given time.90
1. Collective Fact or Shorthand Rendition Lay Opinions
In both categories, the lay witness is deriving an opinion by making a
comparison between a generalization and a case-specific fact or facts. For
instance, consider a collective fact opinion. A lay witness proposes opin-
ing about a person’s intoxication. The witness is drawing on a generaliza-
tion about the behavior of intoxicated persons. It is assumed that in the
United States, on several occasions the typical witness has observed in-
toxicated persons in bars, at parties, or in the home. The generalization
rests largely on the witness’s personal or firsthand knowledge. Strictly
speaking, the generalization may not be based exclusively on such knowl-
edge. For example, at a prior party when the witness believed that some-
one was drunk, another person may have remarked to the witness that
she also believed that the person was intoxicated. However, for the most
part the foundation for the generalization is the witness’s personal obser-
vation of intoxicated individuals.
The witness forms an opinion whether the person involved in the in-
stant case was intoxicated by comparing the generalization to the case-
specific fact or facts. Here, the witness’s personal observation of the con-
duct of that person at the time in question—for instance, immediately
lay a foundation validating the general theory or technique. FED. R. EVID. 702(c); Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993).
87. BROWN, supra note 50, § 11.
88. Id. at 70.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 70–71.
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after the person struck and killed a pedestrian—constitutes the case-spe-
cific information. Under Federal Rules 602 and 701(a),91 the witness must
gain his or her information about the case-specific facts through firsthand
knowledge.
2. Skilled Lay Observer Opinions
Now consider a skilled lay observer opinion. In this category the lay
witness might contemplate opining about the identity of the author of a
writing or a person’s sanity at a particular time.92 Although there are
some superficial differences between collective fact and skilled lay ob-
server opinions, in the final analysis both types of lay opinions are de-
rived by the same reasoning process. Once again, the witness relies on a
generalization. The generalization could be the normal appearance of a
particular author’s handwriting style or a particular person’s baseline, or-
dinary behavior. As in the case of collective fact opinions, the lay wit-
ness’s generalization rests exclusively or primarily on the witness’s
personal knowledge.93 The witness has had prior, repeated opportunities
for observation:94 The witness has seen the person sign numerous docu-
ments,95 or the witness often associates with a person96 and is therefore
familiar with the person’s behavioral baseline. As in the case of collective
fact opinions, the generalization might rest to an extent on sources other
than the witness’s firsthand knowledge. Thus, even if a secretary did not
see his employer sign a prior writing, she might have handed him the
writing and told him that she had just signed it; or while a witness was
observing a person’s conduct on a prior occasion, an acquaintance of the
person might have remarked to the witness that the person’s conduct was
“normal” or “typical.”97 However, in the main, in forming the generaliza-
tion, the witness relies on personal observation.98
Like a lay witness testifying to a collective fact opinion, a lay witness
offering a skilled lay observer opinion derives the opinion by comparing
the generalization to a case-specific fact or facts.99 In a handwriting case,
the case-specific fact is the questioned document presented to the lay wit-
ness on the stand.100 In a sanity case, the case-specific facts are the wit-
ness’s observations of the person’s aberrant behavior at the time in
question.101 In both situations, the witness acquires personal knowledge
of the case-specific fact or facts: The witness can examine the questioned
91. FED. R. EVID. 602, 701.
92. BROWN, supra note 50, § 11, 70–71.
93. Imwinkelried, The Taxonomy of Testimony Post-Kumho, supra note 49, at 196–98.
94. Id. at 198.
95. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(2) (“familiarity”).
96. CAL. EVID. CODE § 870(a) (“[A]n intimate acquaintance of the person whose san-
ity is in question.”).
97. Imwinkelried, The Taxonomy of Testimony Post-Kumho, supra note 49, at 198.
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document exhibit on the stand, and the witness personally perceived the
person’s allegedly insane behavior.102
B. EXPERT OPINIONS
In one respect, the reasoning process underlying an expert opinion is
identical to the reasoning process supporting lay opinions. Like lay opin-
ions, expert opinions are derived by comparing a generalization to a case-
specific fact or facts.103 When a mental health expert opines whether a
patient suffers from a certain mental illness, the expert compares the
symptoms in the patient’s case history to recognized diagnostic criteria
such as the standards set out in the latest edition of the American Psychi-
atric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual.104 Similarly, when
an accident reconstruction expert forms an opinion about the pre-colli-
sion speed of a vehicle, the expert compares the norms for skid marks
and yaw marks with the measurements taken at the collision scene.105 As
in the case of lay opinions, the essence of the expert’s reasoning process is
a comparative judgment.106 However, there are fundamental distinctions
between the two terms of the comparison in lay and expert reasoning
processes.107
1. The Derivation of the Generalization That the Expert Relies On
Of course, it is possible for a scientist to personally design and conduct
a controlled experiment that validates the hypothesis or generalization
that the scientist relies on as the basis for an opinion.108 However, a con-
temporary scientist is almost always at least implicitly relying on prior
empirical studies and discoveries; the contemporary scientist builds on
prior discoveries by earlier researchers in the field.109 To paraphrase Sir
Isaac Newton, modern experts stand on the shoulders of the giants who
preceded them.110 A contemporary physicist need not duplicate the re-
search conducted by Fermi and Oppenheimer before utilizing a general-
ization derived from their research.111 Although a lay witness must rely
on a generalization resting exclusively or primarily on his or her personal
knowledge,112 an expert witness is likely to draw on a wide range of
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL V (5th ed.
2013).
105. GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 57, § 27.06[a]–[b].
106. See id. § 5.05.
107. See infra notes 74–96 and accompanying text.
108. See GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 57, § 5.08.
109. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The “Bases” of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Struc-
ture of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4 (1988).
110. ROBERT KING MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS 9 (1993), quoted in ER-
NEST E. SNYDER, HISTORY OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES 28 (1969).
111. Imwinkelried, The “Bases” of Expert Testimony, supra note 109, at 9.
112. See FED. R. EVID. 701.
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sources,113 including “much hearsay-lectures by his [or her] teachers,
statements in textbooks, reports of experiments and experiences of others
in the same field.”114 In other words, in formulating the generalization,
the expert relies on vicarious as well as personal experience.115 In
Daubert, Justice Blackmun recognized this distinction; he stated that
while lay opinions rest on “firsthand knowledge or observation,” experts
draw on “the knowledge and experience of his [or her] discipline.”116 In
sum, although the reasoning process underlying both lay and expert opin-
ions entails a generalization, expert witnesses derive their generalization
in a very different manner than lay witnesses.117
2. The Manner in Which the Expert Gains Information About the
Case-Specific Fact or Facts to Be Evaluated
We have just seen that while both lay and expert opinions rest on a
comparison between a generalization and a case-specific fact or facts, lay
and expert opinions differ with respect to one term of the comparison,
namely, the generalization the witness relies on.118 The two kinds of opin-
ions also differ with regard to the second term of the comparison, the
case-specific fact or facts. Although lay witnesses must gain their informa-
tion about the case-specific facts solely through personal observation,119
the proponent of an expert opinion has other options.120
The governing statute for experts is Federal Rule of Evidence 703.121
In pertinent part, restyled Rule 703 reads:
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the
expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in
the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or
data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissi-
ble for the opinion to be admitted.122
In effect, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 controls the expert witness’s ma-
jor premise,123 the general theory or technique that the expert relies on in
forming his or her opinion.124 In contrast, Rule 703 governs the expert’s
minor premise,125 that is, the way in which he or she gains information
about the case-specific fact or facts that the theory or technique will be
113. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 148 (1999); Scieszinski, supra
note 14, at 1182.
114. JOHN MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 29 (1947).
115. Imwinkelried, The Taxonomy of Testimony Post-Kumho, supra note 49, at 203.
116. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See FED. R. EVID. 701.
120. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 148 (1999).
121. FED. R. EVID. 703.
122. FED. R. EVID. 703.
123. FED. R. EVID. 702.
124. Imwinkelried, The “Bases” of Expert Testimony, supra note 109.
125. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Developing a Coherent Theory of the Structure of Federal
Rule of Evidence 703, 47 MERCER L. REV. 447, 454 (1996); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The
Meaning of “Facts or Data” in Federal Rule of Evidence 703: The Significance of the Su-
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applied to. As Part II.A demonstrated, a lay witness venturing an opinion
must possess personal knowledge of the case-specific fact or facts.126
However, under Rule 703, there are three distinct ways in which an ex-
pert may obtain such information for his or her analysis.127
At first, it might seem curious that experts should be permitted more
latitude in this respect than lay witnesses. As we have seen, it is sensible
to allow experts greater freedom in formulating their generalizations.128
Although it is feasible for a lay witness to rely solely or primarily on per-
sonal knowledge in developing a generalization about a particular per-
son’s handwriting style, it would be silly to require a nuclear physicist to
rely exclusively on experiments she had personally conducted.129 How-
ever, the focus now is the expert’s minor premise, their case-specific in-
formation rather than their generalization.130 Nevertheless, it is
defensible to accord expert witnesses greater latitude here as well.131 As
Part I.A explains, the policy justification for admitting expert opinions is
the expert’s possession of a knowledge or skill enabling the expert to
draw a more reliable inference than a layperson.132 That is the expert’s
unique contribution to the fact-finding process.133 At early common law,
as in the case of lay witnesses, courts insisted that experts gain their case-
specific information through personal knowledge.134 Since Rule 703 in-
cludes the language, “personally observed,” it is still permissible for ex-
perts to rely on personally acquired information.135 Moreover, as a
matter of trial advocacy, jurors are often more impressed by an expert
who possesses firsthand knowledge.136 However, the courts quickly real-
ized that they could capitalize on the expert’s unique ability to enhance
fact-finding even when the expert lacks personal knowledge.137 If the
case-specific facts are established by other means, the expert is still in a
better position to analyze their significance than either the lay judge or
the lay jurors.138 Ultimately, the courts concluded that it is silly to deny
the legal system expert insights merely because the expert has not person-
ally observed the patient’s wounds or witnessed the traffic accident.139
Once the courts reached that conclusion, they ruled that an expert
could base an opinion on either personal knowledge of the case-specific
preme Court’s Decision to Rely on Federal Rule 702 in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 54 MD. L. REV. 352, 361 (1995).
126. See FED. R. EVID. 701.
127. BROWN, supra note 50, §§ 14–16.
128. Imwinkelried, The “Bases” of Expert Testimony, supra note 109.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 5.
131.
132. GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 57, § 5.02.
133. See id.
134. BROWN, supra note 50, §§ 14–16.
135. FED. R. EVID. 703.
136. See id.
137. BROWN, supra note 50, §§ 14–16.
138. See id.
139. See FED. R. EVID. 703.
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facts or an hypothesis.140 They fashioned the so-called “hypothetical
question technique.”141 In this technique, before calling the expert to the
stand, the expert’s proponent ordinarily calls lay witnesses to testify
about the case-specific fact or facts that the expert will apply the theory
or technique to.142 These lay witnesses present admissible evidence of
facts A and B. When the proponent subsequently calls the expert, before
eliciting the opinion, the proponent resorts to the following formula:
“Doctor, I want you to assume the truth of facts A and B. Assuming
those facts, can you form an opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical
probability, about the cause of Ms. Montoya’s illness?”143
If the expert answers in the affirmative, the judge admits the opinion;
but in the final jury charge, the judge instructs the jurors that they should
disregard the opinion if they disbelieve the lay testimony about A and
B.144 Suppose, for example, that the plaintiff in a personal injury action
retains the world’s leading authority on the plaintiff’s illness. However,
the doctor not only practices on the other side of the country; the doctor
also has such a busy schedule that it is impossible for her to fly to the site
of trial early and personally examine the plaintiff. Nevertheless, by al-
lowing a hypothetical question, the legal system can gain the benefit of
the insight of the pre-eminent authority on the illness in question. The
language of Rule 703, information “the expert has been made aware
of,”145 can be construed as permitting use of the hypothetical question.
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 703 expressly states that the draft-
ers intended to allow litigants to continue to resort to this technique.146
Before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, the
common law limited the allowable means by which experts could gain
their information about the case-specific facts: The expert had to have
personal knowledge of the facts, or the expert’s proponent had to employ
a hypothetical question, necessitating independent, admissible evidence
of the assumed facts.147 However, Rule 703 introduced an innovative
third option.148 While the hypothetical question requires the prior pres-
entation of admissible evidence of the assumed facts, the second sentence
of Rule 703 provides that “[i]f experts in the particular field would rea-
140. Id.
141. BROWN, supra note 50, § 15.
142. In most jurisdictions, the trial judge has discretion whether to permit the expert’s
proponent to elicit the witness’s opinion before calling the lay witnesses to lay the factual
predicate for the opinion. See FED. R. EVID. 611(a). However, judges are usually reluctant
to exercise their discretion to allow the proponent to do so. If the proponent fails to later
present admissible testimony of the assumed facts, the trial judge may have to grant a
motion to strike the expert’s opinion and instruct the jury to disregard the opinion. If the
judge concludes that it is unrealistic to believe that the jury will be able and willing to
follow the curative instruction, the judge may be forced to declare a mistrial in the case.
143. BROWN, supra note 50, § 15.
144. See, e.g., Pa. Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions 4.10B.
145. FED. R. EVID. 703.
146. FED. R. EVID. 703 (advisory committee’s note).
147. BROWN, supra note 50, §§ 14–15.
148. See FED. R. EVID. 703.
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sonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the
subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted.”149
That language created the possibility of the expert’s reliance on out-of-
court, “secondhand”150 reports that would otherwise be inadmissible
under the hearsay rule. The Advisory Committee note to Rule 703
explains:
The third source contemplated by the rule consists of presentation of
data to the expert outside of court and other than by his own percep-
tion. In this respect the rule is designed to broaden the basis for ex-
pert opinions beyond that current in many jurisdictions and to bring
the judicial practice into line with the practice of the experts them-
selves when not in court. Thus a physician in his own practice bases
his diagnosis on information from numerous sources and of consider-
able variety, including statements by patients and relatives, reports
and opinions from nurses, technicians, and other doctors, hospital
records, and X rays. Most of them are admissible in evidence, but
only with the expenditure of substantial time in producing and exam-
ining various authenticating witnesses. The physician makes life-and-
death decisions in reliance upon them. His validation, expertly per-
formed and subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice for judicial
purposes.151
The upshot is that while even today a lay witness venturing an opinion
must have personal knowledge of the case-specific fact or facts, under
Rule 703 an expert witness opining on the same subject may rely on ei-
ther personal knowledge, or a hypothetical question, or a secondhand
report.152
149. FED. R. EVID. 703.
150. BROWN, supra note 50, § 15.
151. FED. R. EVID. 703 (advisory committee’s note). Since the enactment of Rule 703,
the prevailing wisdom has been that secondhand reports are admitted as non-hearsay.
BROWN, supra note 50, § 15; Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Gordian Knot of the Treatment
of Secondhand Facts Under Federal Rule of Evidence 703 Governing the Admissibility of
Expert Opinions: Another Conflict Between Logic and Law, 3 DENV. U. L. REV. 1 (2013).
The conventional view is that under Federal Rule 801(c) the report is logically relevant for
the non-hearsay purpose of showing the effect on the state of mind of the hearer or reader:
The expert’s receipt of the report shows that the expert’s opinion is better founded and
more trustworthy. Under Federal Rule 105, upon request the judge instructs the jury that
they may consider the secondhand report only for the limited purpose of evaluating the
soundness of the expert’s reasoning. However, in 2012 in Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct.
2221, 2234 (2012), five justices—Justice Thomas in concurrence and four dissenters led by
Justice Kagan—forcefully stated their view that when the expert’s opinion is conditioned
on such secondhand reports, the jury must necessarily treat the reports as substantive proof
in order to accept the opinion. On the one hand, the statements by the five justices are
technically dicta; a different five-justice majority—the plurality and Justice Thomas—af-
firmed the conviction on an entirely different theory. On the other hand, when five Su-
preme Court justices declare a view as strongly as these five justices did, lower court judges
tend to sit up and pay attention. It remains to be seen whether the five justices’ views will
prompt lower courts to abandon the conventional wisdom.
152. See FED. R. EVID. 701; FED. R. EVID. 703.
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III. USING THE DIFFERENCES IN REASONING PROCESSES
TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN LAY AND EXPERT
OPINION AND TO DETERMINE THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE TWO
TYPES OF OPINIONS
Part I.A rejected the argument that a trial judge can adequately distin-
guish between lay and expert opinion merely by considering the differing
policy rationales for admitting the two types of opinions.153 That part ar-
gued that without more, a consideration of the different policy rationales
does not give the trial judge a complete analytic framework for drawing
the line on the facts of a concrete case.154 Part II contended that to draw
that line, the judge should instead focus on the differences between the
reasoning processes employed by lay and expert witnesses venturing
opinions.155 If Part II’s contention is correct, examining those differences
should enable trial judges to differentiate between the two kinds of opin-
ion and assist the judge in determining the admissibility of the two types
of opinions.156 The objective of Part III is to demonstrate that a focus on
the differences in reasoning processes has the analytic power to do so.
A. A DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
As the Introduction noted, in the last two decades several develop-
ments have given proponents of opinions a strong motivation to classify
the opinion as lay rather than expert.157 As we have seen, if the opinion is
lay in nature, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26’s mandate for an expert
report is inapplicable.158 The litigant may offer the lay opinion at trial
even though the litigant has not provided the opposition with a report or,
for that matter, given the opposition any special notice of the intent to
offer an opinion.159 Furthermore, if the litigant can persuade the judge to
categorize the opinion as lay, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and
Daubert’s mandate for a showing of empirical reliability do not come into
play.160 In short, the litigant has strong procedural and evidentiary incen-
tives to argue that the opinion is lay rather than expert. How should the
trial judge decide whether to accept that argument? Given the tenor of
the litigant’s argument, before inquiring whether the witness’s conclusion
qualifies as an expert opinion, the judge must first determine whether the
conclusion is admissible as a lay opinion under Federal Rule 701.161
153. See supra Part I.A.
154. See supra Part I.A.
155. See supra Part II.
156. See supra Part II.
157. See supra Introduction.
158. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2).
159. See id.
160. See FED. R. EVID. 701; Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597-98
(1993).
161. See FED. R. EVID. 701.
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1. Lay Opinion Testimony
Given the analysis in Part II, when the litigant offers the testimony as a
lay opinion, it is submitted that the trial judge ought to engage in the
following sequence of analysis.
Initially, the judge should identify both the generalization the lay wit-
ness is relying on and the case-specific fact or facts that the witness will
employ the generalization to evaluate. In some cases, the judge may have
to force the witness’s proponent to identify one or both of the terms of
the comparison.162 Of course, the proponent has the burden of convinc-
ing the judge that the opinion is admissible. If the proponent cannot or
does not clarify the terms of the comparison for the trial judge, the judge
ought to exclude the opinion.
Assuming that the judge can identify the generalization, the judge
should scrutinize the generalization in two respects. First, the judge must
determine whether the generalization rests exclusively, or at least prima-
rily, on the witness’s firsthand knowledge such as personal observations
of a particular person’s handwriting or baseline behavior.163 If a signifi-
cant part of the basis for the generalization consists of out-of-court re-
ports conveyed to the witness, the opinion can be admitted only as expert
opinion.164 Second, even if the generalization is based primarily on the
witness’s personal knowledge, the judge must decide whether, as a matter
of logic, the basis is extensive enough to support the generalization.165
Under California Evidence Code § 870(a), if the proponent offers a lay
opinion about a person’s sanity, it is not enough to establish that the wit-
ness was a passing acquaintance of the person; rather, the statute de-
mands proof that the witness was “an intimate acquaintance”166 of the
person. By the same token, according to Federal Rule of Evidence
901(b)(2), it is not enough that a lay witness has had some exposure to a
claimed author’s handwriting; the statute demands a showing of the wit-
ness’s “familiarity”167 with the person’s handwriting style. The Advisory
Committee Note to the statute indicates that the judge must determine
whether the extent of the witness’s familiarity is “sufficient.”168 At mod-
ern common law, a trial judge has discretion to conclude that the number
of the witness’s prior observations is so small and the support for the
generalization so skimpy that the opinion based on the generalization is
inadmissible.169
162. JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, EVIDENCE § 701.03(1) (2d ed. 2014).
163. See FED. R. EVID. 701.
164. See id.
165. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 162.
166. CAL. EVID. CODE § 870 (2006).
167. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(2); United States v. Apperson, 441 F.3d 1162, 1200–01 (10th
Cir. 2006) (“[B]ased upon his long-standing association with Pickard, he was familiar with
his handwriting.”).
168. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(2) (advisory committee’s note).
169. BROWN, supra note 50, § 223.
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Turning to the other term of the comparison, the judge must also find
that the lay witness has personal knowledge of the case-specific fact or
facts the witness is opining about.170 If the opinion is lay in character, the
witness must satisfy the requirement for firsthand knowledge prescribed
by Rules 602171 and 701(a).172 If the witness’s proponent invites the wit-
ness to assume a fact that another witness has testified to, the proponent
has to rely on Rule 703; but 703 applies only when the witness qualifies as
an expert.173 By parity of reasoning, if the witness proposes relying on a
secondhand report, again the proponent must invoke Rule 703, but that is
permissible only when the witness is an expert.174
If the proponent can surmount all three hurdles, the testimony consti-
tutes a lay opinion under Rule 701.175 More importantly for the propo-
nent, the testimony is admissible under Rule 701.176 However, when the
proponent fails to satisfy even one of the three requirements, the opinion
is admissible only if the testimony qualifies as expert testimony.177 As the
Introduction noted, if the judge characterizes the testimony in that fash-
ion, the characterization will have major procedural and evidentiary con-
sequences.178 If the opinion is expert in nature, the expert’s proponent
should have filed an expert report satisfying Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 26.179 If the proponent neglected to do so, as a discovery sanction,
the trial judge will probably bar the testimony.180 Quite apart from the
procedural issue, the opinion is admissible only if the testimony passes
muster under Rules 702 and 703 governing expert testimony.181
2. Expert Opinion Testimony
To decide whether the testimony can run the gauntlet of Rules 702 and
703, the trial judge should use the following sequence of analysis. As will
soon be evident, there are striking parallels between this sequence and
the sequence appropriate for lay opinion testimony. However, at several
steps in the sequence, the fundamental differences between the reasoning
processes underlying lay and expert opinions necessitate a different anal-
ysis than the judge conducts for lay opinions.
As in the case of lay opinion testimony, at the outset the judge should
force the expert and the expert’s proponent to identify both the general-
ization the expert proposes relying on and the case-specific facts or facts
170. See FED. R. EVID. 701.
171. FED. R. EVID. 602.
172. FED. R. EVID. 701.
173. FED. R. EVID. 703.
174. Id.
175. See FED. R. EVID. 701.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See supra Introduction.
179. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(A).
180. See id.
181. See id.
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the expert will apply the generalization to.182 In many cases, rather than
forthrightly identifying the generalization, the expert attempts to hide be-
hind the conclusory assertion that he or she is relying on their “education
[and] experience.”183 However, in both Joiner184 in 1997 and Kumho185 in
1999, the Supreme Court cautioned trial judges against accepting such
ipse dixit assertions at face value. As the latest edition of one leading
treatise states,
It is certainly unacceptable for the expert to rely on a proposition
that is literally ineffable. An ineffable notion might be acceptable
mysticism at a meeting of the Jedi Council, but it does not qualify as
acceptable expertise [in court]. It is also clear that it is not enough
for the witness to assert in conclusory fashion that she is relying on
her general “expertise,” “knowledge,” or “education.” Those consid-
erations can qualify the witness as an expert, but they do not speak
to the validity of the expert’s theory or technique. To provide a use-
ful insight, the witness must identify a more specific technique or
theory. Otherwise, the witness is venturing nothing more than a
guess.186
The next step in the analysis of an expert opinion parallels the second
step in the analysis for a lay opinion. Here too the judge must scrutinize
the generalization, the theory or technique that the expert contemplates
relying on, to evaluate the case-specific data.187 In one respect, at this
stage in the analysis, the proponent of an expert opinion has greater lati-
tude than the proponent of a lay opinion. As we have seen, under Rules
602 and 701 the proponent must demonstrate that the lay witness’s gener-
alization is based solely or primarily on the witness’s personal knowl-
edge.188 In virtually every case, an expert will draw on out-of-court
statements by third parties such as prior researchers to validate the gener-
alization.189 However, the hearsay rule does not preclude the proponent
from relying on hearsay when the proponent is laying the foundation for
the admissibility of an expert opinion.190 In Daubert,191 Justice Blackmun
expressly stated that Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) prescribes the pre-
liminary fact-finding procedure for the trial judge’s ruling on the admissi-
bility of expert testimony. The last sentence of restyled Rule 104(a) reads:
“In so deciding, the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on
182. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
183. See id.
184. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
185. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 157 (1999).
186. BROWN, supra note 50, § 13; see also State Farm Fire & Cas. v. Electrolux Home
Prods., 980 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1045 (N.D. Ind. 2013) (“[A]n expert ‘who invokes my exper-
tise rather than analytic strategies widely used by specialists is not an expert as Rule 702
defines that term.’”).
187. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
188. See FED. R. EVID. 602; FED. R. EVID. 701.
189. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).
190. See id. at 595.
191. Id. at 592.
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privilege.”192 At first, that sentence may appear heretical—an evidence
code provision stating that a litigant need not comply with technical evi-
dentiary rules. However, the provision is sensible. As the Advisory Com-
mittee Note to Rule 104 explains,193 the widespread assumption is that
the common law evolved exclusionary rules to compensate for lay jurors’
supposedly limited competence to critically assess certain types of evi-
dence such as hearsay. When Rule 104(a) applies, the decision is being
made by the judge, not the jury.194 For that matter, the judge might make
the decision at a pretrial in limine hearing before a jury has even been
selected.195 Hence, it is justifiable to relieve the proponent from the obli-
gation to satisfy technical evidentiary rules in this setting.
However, in other respects the proponent of an expert opinion faces a
rigorous standard. In 2000, reflecting back on its prior decisions in
Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho, the Supreme Court observed that the
Daubert line of authority has erected an “exacting” standard of reliabil-
ity.196 There are several senses in which that observation is correct. To
begin with, it is not enough for the proponent to point to the “global”
validity of the expert’s field or discipline.197 Rather, the proponent must
establish the empirical validity of the specific theory or technique (the
precise generalization) that the expert intends to utilize.198 Next, to vali-
date the generalization, the proponent must present substantial empirical
data and reasoning.199 The Joiner Court assigned the trial judges the re-
sponsibility of inquiring whether there is too great an “analytical gap”
between scant, anecdotal evidence and an expert’s broad conclusion that
a theory or technique is valid.200 Finally, even when the proponent can
point to a quantitatively impressive body of prior research, under
Daubert the judge must make a qualitative assessment whether the re-
search “fit[s]” the case-specific facts in the pending trial.201 Joiner202 is a
case in point. There the plaintiffs marshalled a number of epidemiological
studies.203 However, there were several, marked differences between the
192. FED. R. EVID. 104.
193. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (advisory committee’s note).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000).
197. Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”, supra note 48, at 767.
198. United States v. Fujii, 152 F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (although some tech-
niques in the broad field of questioned document examination may be valid, the proponent
failed to validate the technique that the expert used to identify the author of a document
written in Japanese handprinting); see also United States v. Hermanek, 289 F.3d 1076, 1093
(9th Cir. 2002) (“Neither the government’s offer of proof nor the qualifications of Broder-
ick on the stand established that his interpretations of new words and phrases as references
to cocaine were supported by reliable methods.”).
199. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
200. Id.; Krause v. CSX Transp., 984 F. Supp. 2d 62, 76 (N.D.N.Y. 2013) (“‘[W]hen an
expert opinion is based on data, methodology, or studies that are simply inadequate to
support the conclusions reached, Daubert and Rule 702 mandate the exclusion of that un-
reliable opinion testimony.’”).
201. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993).
202. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 143-44.
203. See id.
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parameters of the studies and the case-specific facts: The decedent was a
human being while the subjects in the studies were mice; the decedent
was an adult while the subject mice were infants; the decedent had der-
mal exposure to the chemical while the mice were directly injected; rela-
tively speaking, the mice received a much larger dosage than the
decedent; and the decedent and the mice developed different types of
cancers.204 The studies may have been numerous, but they did not “fit”
the facts in Joiner.205
The final step in the analytic framework for expert opinions is also
analogous to the last step in the sequence of analysis for lay opinions.
Turning to the second term of the comparison, the trial judge must deter-
mine whether the expert has acceptable sources for his or her knowledge
of the case-specific facts.206 We have seen that Rule 104(a) permits an
expert to draw on hearsay sources to validate his or her generalization—a
freedom denied lay witnesses.207 Likewise, Rule 703 allows an expert to
rely on a broader range of sources for his or her information about the
case-specific facts than the expert’s lay counterpart.208 Like a lay witness,
an expert may rely on personal knowledge—the emergency room physi-
cian may have personally examined the plaintiff’s post-collision
wounds.209 However, unlike the lay witness, the expert is not strictly con-
fined to personally observed facts under Rule 703.210 Alternatively, the
expert may respond to a hypothetical question—but only if the expert’s
proponent calls other witnesses to present admissible evidence of the
truth of all the elements of the hypothesis.211 Finally, the expert may even
rely on inadmissible secondhand reports—but, again, only if the expert’s
proponent establishes that it is a reasonable (customary) practice in the
expert’s specialty to consider such reports.212
204. See id.
205. See id. at 151 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
206. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
207. See FED. R. EVID. 104.




212. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 allows the expert to do so when “experts in the
particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion
on the subject.” FED. R. EVID. 703. At one time, a number of courts construed “reasona-
bly” as if it were synonymous with “customarily.” In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust
Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 275–79 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1985). Thus, if the trial judge found that it was a
specialty’s routine practice to consider a particular type of data under Rule 104(a), the
judge had to allow the expert to rely on that type of information even though the judge
might have grave reservations about the trustworthiness of data from that source. How-
ever, today the prevailing view is that even if the experts in a field routinely consider a
particular type of data, the trial judge has a residual discretion to decide that it is objec-
tively unreasonable to base an opinion on that kind of data. In re Paoli R.R. Yard Pcb
Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 748 (3d Cir. 1994); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp.
1223, 1243–45 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert
Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REV. 577, 578–79 (1986).
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As in the case of lay opinion testimony, the proponent of an expert
opinion must overcome all three hurdles to justify admitting the opinion.
If the proponent falls short of meeting any hurdle—the expert fails to
specify the theory or technique (the generalization) he or she is relying
on, the proponent cannot validate the generalization under Rule 702 and
the Daubert line of precedent, or the expert’s sources for the case-specific
facts do not satisfy Rule 703—the judge should exclude the opinion. If
the conclusion does not qualify as lay or expert opinion, the opinion is
completely inadmissible.
B. AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED
ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK: POLICE OFFICERS’ OPINION
TESTIMONY ABOUT THE MEANING OF
GANG CODE WORDS
One of the hottest battlegrounds in Evidence law today is the contro-
versy over the admissibility of police officers’ testimony about the mean-
ing of terms in conversations between co-conspirators.213 Suppose, for
example, that during its case-in-chief, after laying a proper authentication
foundation214 the prosecution introduces an audio recording of a meeting
between two alleged drug traffickers, including the accused in the pend-
ing case. On the recording, the accused is heard to assure the other al-
leged conspirator that he, the defendant, can deliver “the cake [he]
promised.” The defense contends that the defendant meant “cake” in the
ordinary, innocent, lawful sense. However, after introducing the record-
ing, the prosecution calls a police officer prepared to testify that “cake”
meant crack cocaine. Preliminarily, the officer testifies only that she has
been a police officer, assigned to the drug detail, for the past three years.
When the prosecution attempts to elicit the officer’s opinion that “cake”
was a reference to crack cocaine, the defense objects on two grounds.
First, the defense counsel states that the opinion constitutes expert testi-
mony and that the prosecution neglected to provide the defense with a
report detailing the proposed testimony. The defense counsel urges the
trial judge to bar the opinion as a discovery sanction. Second, reiterating
that the opinion amounts to expert testimony, the defense counsel asserts
213. See, e.g., United States v. Holt, 777 F.3d 1234, 1265-66 (11th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Vera, 770 F.3d 1232, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Kamahele, 748 F.3d
984, 994 (10th Cir. 2014); United States v. Akins, 746 F.3d 590 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied
sub nom. Perkins v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 189 (2014); United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499,
512 (7th Cir. 2009) (“This circuit has routinely upheld the admission of expert testimony
from law enforcement purporting to translate ‘code words’ used by conspirators during
intercepted phone calls.”); United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 211–12 (3rd Cir. 1999);
Brian Gallini, To Serve and Protect? Officers as Expert Witnesses in Federal Drug Prosecu-
tions, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 363 (2012); Joelle Anne Moreno, What Happens When
Dirty Harry Becomes an (Expert) Witness for the Prosecution?, 79 TULANE L. REV. 1, 5
(2004); Scieszinski, supra note 14, at 1161; see also Ralph V. Seep, Admissibility of Expert
Evidence Concerning the Meaning of Narcotics Code Language in Federal Prosecution for
Narcotic Dealing–Modern Cases, 104 A.L.R. FED. 230 (1991). See also United States v.
Prange, 771 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2014).
214. FED. R. EVID. 901.
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that the prosecution has not laid a sufficient foundation to satisfy Federal
Rule 702 and Daubert. The prosecution counters that both defense objec-
tions are meritless, since the testimony is “mere lay opinion testimony.”
How should the trial judge resolve the issues posed by the objection?
Rather than endorsing a categorical view that such testimony always or
never qualifies as lay testimony, the judge should dissect the witness’s
reasoning process. Consider the analysis in two variations of the state of
the record.
1. Police Officer A
The prosecutor asked the trial judge to allow him to expand the record
before the judge rules. During the further questioning, Officer A testifies:
During the year before the accused’s arrest, she was an undercover of-
ficer assigned to infiltrate a particular local drug trafficking organization;
during that time she participated in more than 30 meetings with suspected
members of the gang; the accused attended and spoke during at least 10
of those meetings; at several meetings she personally observed the ac-
cused in possession of illegal drugs, including crack cocaine; in almost all
of the meetings one or more gang members used the term “cake” and
promised to make a delivery of “cake”; and after roughly two thirds of
those meetings the officer witnessed the gang member who had previ-
ously referred to “cake” deliver crack cocaine to a fellow conspirator or
buyer. Given that additional testimony, how should the trial judge rule?
Should the judge overrule the objection on the ground that the testimony
qualifies as a lay opinion?
Initially, the judge ought to identify the generalization that Officer A
intends to rely on. Her generalization is that the members of this particu-
lar gang use the term “cake” as a code word for crack cocaine. In this
state of the record, the generalization rests squarely on the witness’s
“first-hand observations in a specific investigation.”215 The question then
arises whether the witness’s observations are so numerous and consistent
that they support a finding that this gang follows a linguistic convention
equating “cake” with crack cocaine. Officer A testified that she heard
gang members use the term “cake” at tens of meetings and that after
approximately two thirds of those occasions she witnessed gang members’
subsequent conduct indicating that they meant crack cocaine when they
said “cake.” Although they said they were going to deliver “cake,” they
in fact delivered crack cocaine. The judge should, and probably would,
find that the foundation adequately validates the witness’s generalization
under Rules 602 and 701.
If the witness’s generalization passes muster, the judge should then
turn his attention to the witness’s knowledge of the case-specific fact be-
ing evaluated. Again, we are assuming that the prosecution laid an ade-
quate authentication foundation for the audio recording. Earlier in her
215. Akins, 746 F.3d at 599.
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testimony, Officer A testified that she heard the accused speaking on at
least ten occasions and is therefore presumably familiar with his voice.216
At this point in Officer A’s direct examination, the prosecutor replays the
recording. Listening to the recording, Officer A hears the accused use the
term “cake.” Hence, Officer A undeniably has personal knowledge of the
case-specific fact that the accused used that term.
Since both terms of the witness’s comparative judgment satisfy the re-
quirements for an admissible lay opinion, the judge should overrule the
defense objection. There was no need for the prosecution to file an expert
report previewing Officer A’s testimony, and similarly there is no need
for the judge to subject the opinion to a Daubert analysis.217 Officer A’s
lay opinion is admissible.
2. Police Officer B
In this variation of the record, the prosecution calls Officer B rather
than Officer A. Once again, the prosecutor seeks leave to augment the
record before the judge rules; and the judge grants leave. Officer B testi-
fies that: (1) she was not involved in the investigation that led to the cur-
rent charges; (2) she has been assigned to the drug detail for over a
decade; (3) during that decade she attended several courses on drug in-
vestigations at the police academy; (4) one of those courses covered the
subject of the use of code words by drug traffickers; (5) she has never
heard the term “cake” used by any suspect in a drug investigation she has
personally participated in; and (6) at the police academy course she at-
tended, one instructor stated that drug traffickers sometimes use terms
such as “cake” when they mean an illegal drug. After listening to the
recording, Officer B is prepared to opine that the accused’s use of the
term “cake” was a coded reference to crack cocaine. Now how should the
trial judge rule?
Given the analytic framework proposed in this article, the judge should
certainly not overrule the defense objection on the ground that Officer
B’s opinion qualifies as an admissible lay opinion. It is true that like Of-
ficer A, Officer B has personal knowledge of one term of the comparison,
that is, the case-specific fact that the accused uttered the word “cake.”
However, when the judge shifts the analysis to the other term of the com-
parison, the witness’s generalization about the meaning of “cake,” the
judge will be forced to conclude that the witness did not derive the gener-
alization either solely or primarily through personal observation. Rather,
Officer B is “‘synthesi[zing] . . . various source materials,”218 notably the
216. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(5) (“The following are examples only—not a complete list—
of evidence that satisfies the requirement [for authentication]: (5) Opinion About a Voice.
An opinion identifying a person’s voice, whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or
electronic transmission or recording, based on hearing the voice at any time under circum-
stances that connect it with the alleged speaker.”).
217. Akins, 746 F.3d at 598–600.
218. United States v. Kamahele, 748 F.3d 984, 999 (10th Cir. 2014); see also United
States v. Carlos Cruz, 352 F.3d 499, 505 (1st Cir. 2003) (the witness relied on information
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assertion she heard at the police academy course she attended. The con-
clusion is unavoidable: If this opinion is to be admitted at all, it must be
admitted as an expert opinion.
If, as defense counsel claimed at the time of the objection, the prosecu-
tion did not furnish the defense with a detailed report previewing Officer
B’s opinionated testimony, that may be the end of the judge’s analysis.
Without even reaching the Rule 702 issue, the judge might well impose a
discovery sanction altogether barring the opinion.
Even putting aside the procedural issue, the prosecutor will be hard
pressed to persuade the judge that Officer B’s testimony constitutes an
admissible expert opinion. On the one hand, there is no problem with the
case-specific fact term of the witness’s comparison. Having listened to the
same audio recording, Officer B has as much personal knowledge as Of-
ficer A that the accused used the term “cake.”
On the other hand, the other term of the witness’s comparison, the
witness’s generalization, is problematic. The judge should arguably con-
clude that the prosecutor has failed to establish that the witness’s general-
ization that drug traffickers use “cake” as a synonym for crack cocaine
qualifies under Rule 702 and Daubert. Other than an isolated statement
at a single police academy course, Officer B has not marshaled any em-
pirical data supporting the generalization. The isolated statement falls far
short of constituting a scientific study. For that matter, there is no indica-
tion that the statement reflects a reliable compilation of field observa-
tions by other undercover drug officers. It is true that by virtue of the last
sentence of Rule 104(a), in ruling on the admissibility of Officer B’s opin-
ion the judge may consider the statement made at the course.219 The
hearsay rule is not a bar.220 Yet, even if the judge considers the statement,
standing alone the statement is hardly persuasive proof of the existence
of the linguistic convention. Without additional foundational proof, the
statement is merely a solitary ipse dixit assertion by an unidentified
speaker. As previously stated, in both Joiner221 and Kumho,222 the Su-
preme Court cautioned trial judges against indiscriminately accepting
such assertions at face value. If the judge takes seriously the Court’s char-
acterization of the Rule 702 standard as “exacting,”223 the prosecutor’s
expert testimony foundation for Officer B’s opinion is wanting. In short,
Officer B’s testimony is inadmissible.224 It cannot be accepted as either
lay or expert opinion testimony.
“known with the police department”); People v. Sanchez, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 271, 275–76 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2003) (the police witness relied on his training as well as his personal experience).
219. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
220. See id.
221. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
222. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 157 (1999).
223. Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000).
224. See United States v. Hermanek, 289 F.3d 1076, 1093 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Neither the
government’s offer of proof nor the qualification of Broderick on the stand established
that his interpretations of new words and phrases as references to cocaine were supported
by reliable methods.”).
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The distinction between the testimony of Officer A and Officer B
dovetails with the difference between the appellate court’s analysis in
United States v. Akins225 and the trial judge’s analysis in United States v.
Dukagjini.226 In Akins, the analysis by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
was exemplary. At trial, the prosecution called a veteran Secret Service
agent, Lyons, to testify as to the interpretation of alleged code words on
intercepted calls between the alleged coconspirators. For example, Lyons
opined that “three zones” meant “three ounces.”227 The court upheld the
foundation for Lyons’ opinion because Lyons had personal knowledge
that in conversations the co-conspirators had used those “terms inter-
changeably.”228 The court’s analysis was both detailed and sound.
However, in Dukagjini, the prosecution witness, an experienced Drug
Enforcement Agency agent, Biggs, overstepped the bounds.229 Initially,
the trial judge warned the prosecution to restrict Biggs to opinions about
“words of trade, jargon.”230 However, as the trial unfolded, Biggs strayed,
and the trial judge did not reign him in.231 Although Biggs opined about
the meaning of certain terms used by the alleged co-conspirators, there
was “[n]o evidence [in the record] that these phrases were drug code with
fixed meaning either within the narcotics world or within this particular
conspiracy.”232 That gap was fatal to the admissibility of Biggs’ conclu-
sions. The admission of the conclusions could not be justified as expert
opinions because Biggs never established that he had reliable out-of-
court sources warranting his belief that the words had acquired a particu-
lar meaning in the drug milieu.233 Moreover, the introduction of the con-
clusions could not be rationalized as lay opinions because, unlike agent
Lyons in Akins, Biggs did not describe any aspects of specific conversa-
tions among alleged co-conspirators that rationally supported his infer-
ence that they had used the words in the particular sense that he
attributed to them. While Akins is the model,234 Dukagjini is the caution-
ary tale.235
IV. CONCLUSION
There is a widespread perception that the courts are struggling in en-
deavoring to draw the line between lay opinion and expert opinion. In the
225. 746 F.3d 590 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Perkins v. United States, 135
S.Ct. 189 (2014).
226. 326 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2003).
227. Atkins, 746 F.3d at 600 n.15.
228. Id.
229. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d at 49–50.
230. Id. at 50.
231. See id.
232. Id. at 55.
233. Id.
234. Riley v. Univ. of Ala. Health Servs. Found., 990 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1186 (N.D. Ala.
2014); Parrott v. PNC Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 986 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1271 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (“The
nature and extent of the . . . observations of the witness should be as detailed as possible
. . . .”).
235. See generally Akins, 746 F.3d 590; Dukagjini, 326 F.3d at 45.
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view of some commentators, the courts are experiencing “tremendous
difficulty” in distinguishing between the two types of opinion.236 The mi-
crocosm of case law analyzing the admissibility of police officer testimony
about the meaning of alleged drug code words illustrates that diffi-
culty.237 In those cases, the courts are finding the distinction to be a
troublingly “fine line.”238 Worse still, two 1993 developments, the amend-
ment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 and the Supreme Court’s
Daubert decision, have heightened the need to define that line with
confidence.239
The thesis of this article is that the distinction has proven to be unman-
ageable because the courts have looked to unsatisfactory bases for defin-
ing the distinction. Admittedly, there is a clear difference between the
policy rationale for admitting lay opinions (the witness’s inability to artic-
ulate the primary underlying data) and the justification for accepting ex-
pert opinions (the expert’s superior ability to draw a reliable inference
from the underlying data). However, even if the trial judge appreciates
that theoretical difference, without more that insight does not provide the
judge with a concrete analytic frame for drawing the line in a particular
case. Part II explained why the other attempts to define the distinction,
focusing on characteristics of the final opinion, are equally unhelpful.
This article has argued that to draw the line and intelligently analyze
the admissibility of lay and expert opinions, the judge should focus on the
reasoning processes underlying the two types of opinions. In both cases,
the witness makes a comparative judgment, employing a generalization to
evaluate a case-specific fact or facts. Part II demonstrated that there are
fundamental epistemological differences between the two types of opin-
ions. While lay witnesses form their generalizations primarily through
firsthand knowledge, out of necessity experts rely on other, hearsay
sources of information.240 Like Newton, to some extent, every expert
stands on the shoulder of the giants who preceded him or her.241 Further-
more, although lay witnesses must acquire their information about the
case-specific facts to be evaluated exclusively through personal knowl-
edge, Federal Rule of Evidence 703 permits experts to draw on a much
wider range of sources of information.242 Once the judge appreciates the
basic differences between the reasoning process underlying a lay opinion
236. Scieszinski, supra note 14, at 1181. But see United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499, 512
(7th Cir. 2009) (“This circuit has routinely upheld the admission of expert testimony from
law enforcement purporting to translate ‘code words’ used by conspirators during inter-
cepted phone calls.”); United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 211–12 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Such
testimony is relatively uncontroversial when it permits a government agent to explain the
actual meaning of coded words–that is, when the agent acts as a translator of sorts . . . .”).
237. Scieszinski, supra note 14, at 1182–83. See United States v. Kamahele, 748 F.2d 984
(10th Cir. 2014); Akins, 746 F.3d 590.
238. Scieszinski, supra note 14, at 1182.
239. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(A); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993).
240. See FED. R. EVID. 701; FED. R. EVID. 703.
241. See Merton, supra note 110, at 9.
242. See FED. R. EVID. 701; FED. R. EVID. 703.
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and that supporting an expert opinion, the analysis is fairly straightfor-
ward. By carefully dissecting the reasoning process underpinning the wit-
ness’s opinion, the courts will not only improve the courts’ ability to
distinguish between lay and expert opinions; as Part III demonstrated,
clarifying the distinction should also sharpen the courts’ analysis of the
admissibility of the two species of opinion. In Daubert, Justice Blackmun
quite properly wrote that the focus should “not [be] on the conclusions”
that the expert is prepared to testify to.243 Rather, like an epistemologist,
the judge ought to ask: What is the warrant for that conclusion? How did
you reason to that opinion?244
243. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
244. United States v. Akins, 746 F.3d 590, 600 n.15 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Lyons repeatedly
explained how this investigation led him to deduce the meaning of drug code words. Lyons
explained, for example, that he knows ‘three zones’ is ‘three ounces’ because he heard the
speakers on the intercepted calls use the terms interchangeably; . . . that a ‘nine’ referred to
nine ounces of cocaine because the quoted price was consistent with that amount in the
investigation here . . . .’”); Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 983 F. Supp. 2d 369, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[A]n expert opinion requires some explanation as to how the expert
came to his conclusion . . . .”).
